Waiver of the Statute of Frauds Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-209: Double-E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank by unknown
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 3 Article 11
Waiver of the Statute of Frauds Under Uniform
Commercial Code Section 2-209: Double-E
Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank
Copyright c 1974 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Waiver of the Statute of Frauds Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-209: Double-E Sportswear
Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 15 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 699 (1974), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
wmlr/vol15/iss3/11
COMMENTS
WAIVER OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS UNDER UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 2-209: DOUBLE-E
SPORTSWEAR CORP. v. GIRARD TRUST BANK
Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code1 reflects an attempt
to adapt previous statutes and the common law to the sophisticated
commercial practices of the modern marketplace while retaining safe-
guards against perjury and fraud. The provisions of this section, which
govern modifications of contracts for the sale of goods, however, are
subject to a number of interpretational difficulties.2  One particularly
significant question was brought into focus by the recent decision of
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Double-E Sportswear
Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank3 that an attempted oral modification of a
contract may operate as a waiver of the express statute of frauds pro-
visions of the Code. Central to this ruling was an interpretation of the
relationship between Code section 2-209(3), which requires that all
contract modifications be in writing if the contract, as modified, is
subject to the express statute of frauds requirements of the Code, and
section 2-209(4), which states that an attempted modification which
fails to satisfy the requirements of subsection (3) or a private statute of
frauds between the parties under subsection (2) may nevertheless op-
erate as a "waiver." 4 Specifically, the court was faced with the neces-
sity of determining precisely what may be waived under the provisions
of section 2-209(4).
1. Uironiu CODmmciAL CODE § 2-209 [hereinafter cited as UCCJ. The text of
section 2-209 is reproduced at note 33 infra.
2. See, e.g., All-Year Golf, Inc. v. Products Investors Corp., 34 App. Div. 2d 246,
310 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Thomas Knutson Shipbuilding Corp. v. George
Rogers Constr. Corp., 6 UCC REP. SERv. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); Edelstein v. Carole
House Apts., Inc., 220 Pa. Super. 298, 286 A.2d 658 (1971); Asco Mining Co. v. Gross
Contracting Co., 3 UCC REP. SERv. 293 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1965); Inwood Knitting Mills, Inc.
v. Budge Mfg. Co., 1 UCC REP. SERV. 84 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1962); In re Estate of Upchurch,
62 Tenn. App. 634, 466 S.V.2d 886 (1970). See generally Note, The Scope and Meaning
of Waiver in Section 2-209 of the Uniform Conzercial Code, 5 GA. L. REv. 783 (1971);
Comment, Oral Modification of Sales Contracts and the Statute of Frauds, 21 DRAKE L.
RLv. 593 (1972); Comment, The Mechanics of Parol Modification of Contracts Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 U. Prr. L. REv. 665 (1968).
3. 488 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1973).
4. It is imperative at this point to distinguish between oral modification of a contract
and the elimination of a condition for performance by a promisor's waiver. "A con-
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Before examining the propriety of the decision in Double-E permit-
ting waiver of the statute of frauds requirements of Code section 2-201,5
it is necessary to survey the evolution of the statute of frauds and the
concept of oral modification of contracts to their current status under
Code sections 2-201 and 2-209, respectively. The interrelationship of
these two sections must then be analyzed to ascertain the effect of the
Double-E holding upon the balance of commercial flexibility and pro-
tection from fraud which it is necessary that the Code provide.
PRE-CoDE ORAL MODIFICATION OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS
Oral promises became enforceable at English common law during the
fourteenth century with the advent of actions in assumpsit,6 but inequity
soon resulted because of rigid procedural rules facilitating the perpetra-
tion of fraud by anyone willing to suborn perjury.7 Lending vitality to
this unfortunate consequence was the rule precluding testimony from
parties to a lawsuit, as well as that prohibiting courts from overturning
jury verdicts regardless of their reasonableness in light of the evidence
presented.8 With little to inhibit them, allegations of nonexistent oral
contracts became increasingly common until 1677 when the House of
Lords responded with "An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries." 0
The English Statute of Frauds predicated the enforceability of a con-
tract for the sale of goods priced at ten or more pounds sterling upon
tractual modification ... produces the usual effects of other valid contracts." 3A A.
CORBIN, CoNTaAcrs § 752, at 482 (1960). A waiver, on the other hand, rather than
constituting a binding agreement, is generally defined as the "intentional relinquishment
of a known right." 3 S. Wn.LisToN, LAW OF CoNm-Rcrs § 678, at 1959 (rev. ed. 1936).
There are several possible meanings of "waiver" (id. § 679, at 1960-63), and it has
been said that the term "cannot be defined without reference to the kind of circum-
stances to which it is being related." 3A A. CORIN, supra, § 752, at 478. It is clear,
however, that in the context of variations from the terms of, a binding contractual
relationship, a waiver becomes enforceable only when another party relies thereon,
the waiving party thereafter being estopped from enforcing the term. Id. at 480-81.
A modification possesses all characteristics of a contract and is enforceable even absent
detrimental reliance. The failure adequately to recognize this distinction has been a
major source of difficulty in interpreting section 2-209.
5. The text of Code section 2-201 is reproduced at note 21 infra.
6. 2 A. CoRBIN, supra note 4, § 275, at 2.
7. Id.
8. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CONAMRCIAL
CODE 43 (1972).
9. 29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677).
[Vol. 15:699
uCC SECTION 2-209
the existence of a writing signed by the party against whom enforce-
ment was sought or upon part performance. I°
Although the Statute of Frauds undoubtedly provided for a more
equitable result in many cases by preventing enforcement of nonexistent
oral agreements," it created a countervailing opportunity for those
entering oral agreements to avoid enforcement with impunity.12
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a steady undercur-
rent of criticism appeared, first in England and later in the United States,
as the Statute's potential for encouraging fraud became manifest." Con-
sequently, there evolved a tendency by many courts to circumvent the
writing requirement, 4 often upon what one commentator has termed
"flimsy grounds." 15
Despite the growing disenchantment with the Statute of Frauds, it
was adopted, without substantial change, as section 4 of the Uniform
Sales Act.'" Thus, during the period immediately preceding the drafting
of the Uniform Commercial Code, application of statute of frauds re-
10. Section 17 of the English Statute provided: "[N]o contract for the sale of any
goods, wares, merchandises, for the price of ten pounds sterling or upwards, shall be
allowed to be good, except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually
receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the bargain or in part of pay-
ment, or that some note or memorandum in writing of the said bargain be made and
signed by the parties to be charged by such contract, or their agents thereunto lawfully
authorized." Id. § 17.
11. The extent to which the Statute of Frauds actually deterred those who otherwise
would have attempted to enforce nonexistent promises cannot be measured. Various
courts, apparently relying on reason rather than empirical data, have nevertheless
lavished praise upon the rule. See, e.g., Dunphy v. Ryan, 116 U.S. 491, 498 (1886)
("The statute of frauds is founded in wisdom and has been justified by long ex-
perience.').
12. 2 A. CoaBiN, supra note 4, § 275, at 3.
13. Id. at 8 & n.9.
14. Id. at 3 n.2; see, e.g., Piper v. Fosher, 121 Ind. 407, 23 N.E. 269 (1890); Bader v.
Hiscox, 188 Iowa 986, 174 N.W. 565 (1919); Hillhouse v. Jennings, 60 S.C. 373, 38 S.E.
599 (1901).
15. 2 A. CoriN, supra note 4, 5 275, at 3.
16. This uniform act was adopted in 36 jurisdictions but has since been superceded
in each with the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 4(1) provided:
"A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of five
hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall
accept part of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and
actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part
payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be
signed by the party to be charged or his agent in that behalf."
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quirements in a majority of states was subject to vast judicial discretion,
with little uniformity among the various jurisdictions. 7
The Statute of Frauds applied to common law agreements modifying
contracts in precisely the same manner it applied to original contracts;
modifications which either brought a contract within the ambit of the
Statute or failed to remove a contract from its reach were enforceable
only if evidenced by a writing, or if partially performed.'8 Although
there was never uniform judicial response in this country with respect
to the effect of the Statute upon oral modifications, the majority of
American courts followed the common law rule, applying the Statute
anew to the contract in its modified state. 19 This practice continued
until adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, since the Uniform
Sales Act did not regulate oral modifications of contracts. 2
17. Courts of equity refused to enforce the Statute of Frauds whenever they de-
termined that strict adherence would promote, rather than prevent, fraud. See, e.g.,
Montgomery v. Moreland, 205 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1953); Holton v. Reed, 193 F.2d
390 (10th Cir. 1951); Munzenmaier v. Quick, 134 Conn. 404, 58 A.2d 378 (1948); Har-
rington v. Harrington, 172 Kan. 549, 241 P.2d 513 (1952); Wussler v. Peterson, 270
S.W.2d 12 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1954); Curcio v. Lounsbury, 64 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Cr. 1946);
Cobble v. Langford, 190 Tenn. 385, 230 S.W.2d 194 (1950); Clark v. Atkins, 188 Va.
668, 51 S.E.2d 222 (1949).
Even courts of. law exercised wide discretion in interpreting the Statute and de-
termining what transactions were exempted from its writing requirement. Compare
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954), holding the Statute
of Frauds a rule of substance, zzith Carmichael v. Stone, 243 Iowa 904, 54 NAV.2d 454
(1952), terming it a rule of evidence, and Grossman v. Levy's, 81 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1955),
holding that the Statute affects only the remedy. Compare Kavanaugh v. England, 232
Ind. 54, 110 N.E.2d 329 (1953), which held that a contract requirement that the parties
perform some act in addition to the sale of goods did not remove the contract from
the Statute, with Gronvold v. Whaley, 39 Wash. 2d 710, 237 P.2d 1026 (1951), where
a contract for a transfer of securities, along with other obligations, was held not to be
a sale of goods. Conpare Rosen v. Garston, 319 Mass. 390, 66 N.E.2d 29 (1946), where
specially manufactured goods not suitable for general sale were exempted from the
Statute, with H.W. Myers & Son v. Felopulos, 116 Vt. 364, 76 A.2d 552 (1950), where
specially manufactured goods were not excepted from the operation of the Statute.
For a case demonstrating judicial extension of the Statute of Frauds, see Trefethen v.
Amazeen, 96 N.H. 160, 71 A.2d 741 (1950), in which a contract to will personalty was
found to be within the Statute of Frauds.
18. 2 A. CoaIN, supra note 4, § 301, at 88-90.
19. See, e.g., Brown v. Aiken, 329 Pa. 566, 198 A. 441 (1938); Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 234 Pa. 100, 83 A. 54 (1912).
20. For cases in which modifications were held unenforceable absent a writing,
see Tractor Supply & Overseas Exch. Corp. v. Ellard Contracting Co., 119 F. Supp. 814
(N.D. Ala. 1954); McClure v. Cerati, 86 Cal. App. 2d 74, 194 P.2d 46 (1948); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Willcoxon, 211 Ga. 462, 86 S.E.2d 507 (1955); Michael Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Institution for Savings, 321 Mass. 215, 72 N.E.2d 514 (1947). But see Hotchner v. Neon
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MODIFICATION OF WRITTEN CONTRACTS UNDER THE UCC
Statute of Frauds Under the Code
The statute of frauds codified in section 2-20121 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code differs substantially from its English predecessor, 22 section
2-201 (1) permitting enforcement of contracts substantiated by a writing
Prods., Inc, 163 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1947); Mandel v. Atlas Assur. Co., 230 Minn. 347,
41 N.W.2d 590 (1950) (rule requiring written modification subject to exception); Man-
ning v. Barnard, 277 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Garcia v. Karam, 154 Tex.
240, 276 S.I.2d 255 (1955). Compare Brewood v. Cook, 207 F.2d 439 (D.C. Cir. 1953),
in which reliance upon an oral modification effected a waiver of the Statute of
Frauds, 'with Polka v. May, 383 Pa. 80, 118 A.2d 154 (1955), in which the court held
the operation of the Statute to be unaffected by reliance and estoppel.
21. UCC § 2-201 provides:
(I) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale
of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of
action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a
contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or
broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states
a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this para-
graph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirma-
tion of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the
party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the require-
ments of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection
to its contents is given within 10 days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection
(I) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are
not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's
business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and
under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for
the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture
or commitments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading,
testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but
the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity
of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted
or which have been received and accepted (Sec. 2-606).
22. J. WmTE & R. SumzaRs, supra note 8, at 43-44. Although the authors state that
there is a significant difference between the Statute of Frauds of 1677 and UCC section
2-201, their discussion primarily illustrates similarities between the two statutes. Sec-
tion 2-201 (1) closely resembles its predecessor by retaining a minimum price require-
ment for determining which contracts are subject to the statute.
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which omits or states incorrectly a material term23 and sections 2-201 (2)
and (3) specifying four exceptions to the writing requirement. Section
2-201 (2) compliments section 2-201 (1) with even more liberal writing
requirements as between merchants, providing for enforcement of cer-
tain writings not signed by the merchant against 'whom enforcement is
sought.24 This section serves to remedy the pre-Code inequity by which
the recipient of a confirmatory memorandum, while escaping enforce-
ment at will, could nevertheless bind the sender.25 A second exception,
contained in section 2-201 (3) (a), permits a party to an oral contract to
enforce the agreement whenever a substantial beginning has been made
to produce "specially manufactured" goods for the other party.26 This
section was carefully worded to prevent the inequities to sellers of spe-
cially manufactured goods which often resulted at common law and
under the Uniform Sales Act.27
Section 2-201 (3) (b) permits enforcement of an oral contract when
its existence is admitted during legal proceedings.28 A comment to sec-
tion 2-201 indicates that this exception, like the two previously dis-
23. UCC § 2-201(1). Although this provision technically is not an exception to the
writing requirement, it is a significant liberalization since at common law every ma-
terial term had to be stated precisely in the writing. See, e.g., Soya Processing Co. v.
Sirota, 104 F. Supp. 428 (SD.N.Y. 1952). Under section 2-201 a contract is enforceable
even when the price term is omitted. See, e.g., Julian C. Cohen Salv. Corp. v. Eastern
Elec. Sales Co., 205 Pa. Super. 26, 206 A.2d 331 (1965). In Port City Constr. Co. v.
Henderson, 48 Ala. App. 639, 266 So. 2d 896 (1972), the court observed that section 2-201
was drafted to liberalize the former requirement that all terms be embodied in writing.
Such an intent is found in a comment to section 2-201: "[Alll that is required [under
the Code] is that the writing afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence
rests on a real transaction.... The only term which must appear is the quantity term
which need not be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the amount stated."
UCC § 2-201, Comment 1.
24. UCC § 2-201(2). When an oral contract is made betveen merchants and a
written confirmation is sent from one to the other, the contract may be enforced
against the recipient even without his signature on the instrument, provided he re-
ceives the confirmation within a reasonable time and has reason to know of its contents.
Id. See, e.g., Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d 114
(3d Cir. 1965).
25. J. Wrm & R. SuMMERs, supra note 8, at 47-48.
26. UCC § 2-201 (3) (a). See, e.g., Pittsburgh Metal Lithographing Co. v. Sovereign
Corp., 220 Pa. Super. 219, 283 A.2d 714 (1971).
27. Proof that goods were being specially manufactured for the buyer did not neces-
sarily bring the contract within the general part performance exception under the
original Statute of Frauds. Cooke v. Millard, 65 N.Y. 352 (1875).
28. UCC § 2-201(3) (b). See, e.g., Garrison v. Piatt, 113 Ga. App. 94, 147 S.E.2d 374
(1966).
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cussed, liberalizes the pre-Code writing requirement, stating: "Under
this section it is no longer possible to admit the contract in court and
still treat the Statute as a defense." 29 The final express exception pro-
vides for enforcement of oral sales contracts when partial payment or
partial delivery has been made. 0 A similar exception was recognized
under the original Statute of Frauds; the Code version is, in fact, nar-
rower than its common law predecessor. Formerly, oral contracts for
the sale of goods were wholly enforceable if there had been substantial
performance in accordance with the contract.31 The official comments
to the Code, however, clearly indicate that partial performance of a
contract is enforceable thereunder as a substitute for a writing only to
the extent of goods actually paid for or accepted. 32
An examination of the four exceptions to the statute of frauds pro-
visions under the Code demonstrates that no consistent effort was made
either to liberalize or to restrict the pre-Code requirements for enforce-
ability. Indeed, that section 2-201 contains provisions exhibiting each
such tendency may suggest an intent to incorporate in one section all
permissible exceptions to the section 2-201 writing requirement. An ex-
amination of the Code provisions regulating contract modifications is
necessary to ascertain whether an additional, implicit exception arises
from the interaction of such provisions with those of section 2-201.
Contract Modification Under the UCC
Unlike the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform Commercial Code in-
cludes a provision explicitly regulating contract modification. Section
29. UCC § 2-201, Comment 7 (emphasis supplied).
30. Id. § 2-201 (3) (c).
31. See, e.g., Sharpensteen v. Pearce, 219 Ark. 916, 245 S.W.2d 385 (1952); Kurlan
v. CBS, 40 Cal. 2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953); Suverkrup v. Suhl, 108 Cal. App. 2d 284,
238 P.2d 674 (1951); Invincible Parlor Frame Co. v. Elegant Leather Goods, Inc., 187
Misc. 454, 62 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Sup. Ct. 1946). This common law exception to the writing
requirement was created by the original Statute of Frauds for situations in which the
"buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold .. . or give something in earnest to bind
the bargain or in part payment." 29 Car. II, c. 3, § 17 (1677).
32. UCC § 2-201, Comment 2 states: "'Partial performance' as a substitute for
the required memorandum can validate the contract only for the goods which have
been accepted or for which payment has been made and accepted." See, e.g., Bagby
Land & Cattle Co. v. California Livestock Comm'n Co, 439 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1971);
Artman v. International Harvester Co., 355 F. Supp. 476 (WV.D. Pa. 1972); Huyler Paper
Stock Co. v. Information Supplies Corp., 117 NJ. Super. 353, 284 A.2d 568 (Super. Ct.
1971); Starr v. Freeport Dodge, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 271, 282 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Dist. Ct. 1967).
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2-20933 is designed to facilitate the modification of contracts by re-
moving some of the technical barriers in existence prior to enactment of
the Code14 while retaining adequate protections against fraud and per-
jury.
Section 2-209 (1) eliminates the common law requirement that modi-
fying agreements be supported by separate consideration and premises
their enforceability instead upon a finding that the parties acted in good
faith. 5 The substitution of a "good faith" test for the former require-
ment of consideration has circumvented the technical problems engen-
dered by the common law "pre-existing duty" rule36 and cultivated a
new flexibility more reflective of modern commercial reality. The basic
freedom of modification established in section 2-209(1) is limited by
the requirement in subsection (2) that the parties honor a "no oral
modification" clause if included in the contract terms.37 In addition,
subsection (3) mandates compliance with the statute of frauds pro-
visions of Code section 2-201.38
33. UCC § 2-209 provides:
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no con-
sideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except
by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except
as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the
merchant must be separately signed by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article
(Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its
provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy
the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of the
contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the
other party that strict performance will be required of any term waived,
unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of posi-
tion in reliance on the waiver.
34. Comment 1 to section 2-209 states that the section was promulgated to "protect
and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without
regard to the technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments."
35. UCC § 2-209, Comment 2.
36. At common law, a promise to do what one was already contractually obligated
to do was unenforceable as being without consideration. E.g., Foakes v. Beer, 5 Coke
Rep. 117a (1602).
37. UCC § 2-209(2). A clause inserted in a contract requiring that modification
of the contract be in writing operates much like the statute of frauds in section 2-201,
except that it is a term of the contract and is private between those in privity.
38. Id. § 2-209(3).
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It has been suggested that sections 2-209(4) and (5) provide a
method by which the parties to a contract may partially emasculate
the private statute of frauds procedure outlined in section 2-209(2). 39
Moreover, under the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in Double-E, these provisions may effectively limit the apparently
absolute requirement in section 2-209(3) that certain modifications
comply with the requirements of the section 2-201 statute of frauds.
Section 2-209(4) acknowledges that an attempted modification which
fails to satisfy either a private writing requirement or section 2-201 of
the Code may nevertheless operate as a "waiver," 41 while section 2-
209(5) describes the procedure for retracting this "waiver." n4 A thor-
ough analysis of the waiver and retraction subsections and of the in-
teraction between sections 2-209 and 2-201 is essential to an evaluation
of the result in Double-E.
SECTION 2-209: A CLOSER ANALYSIS
The defendant bank in Double-E had contracted to sell shirts and
sweaters to the plaintiff company,42 reserving an option to cancel the
contract "for any reason" by giving adequate notice prior to the sched-
uled delivery date.43 After receiving a higher offer from a third party,
the bank inquired whether plaintiff would prefer to meet the new
offer or have the bank exercise its option to cancel. Plaintiff indicated
a willingness to match the third party's offer and entered into an oral
agreement for the submission of sealed bids, the bank agreeing to re-
linquish its right to cancel if the plaintiff submitted the higher bid.44
Although the plaintiff's representative offered to attend the bank's of-
fices that day to reduce the oral modification to writing, the defendant
suggested that the meeting take place the following day. Upon arrival
39. R. NoRDsRmoM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF SALES 123 (1970).
40. UCC § 2-209(4).
41. Id. § 2-209(5).
42. The contract clearly was within the statute of frauds, the plaintiff being required
to deposit $5,000 on account. 488 F.2d at 293.
43. Paragraph 10 of the agreement provided: "Seller is hereby granted an option
to cancel and terminate this Agreement, for any reason whatever, provided such option
is exercised by notice in writing to that effect forwarded to Buyer together with the
sum of $5,000 deposited hereunder on or before April 1, 1971, whereupon all liability
from either party to the other shall cease and terminate and this Agreement shall be-
come null and void." Id.
44. If the bid of, the third party was higher than that of the plaintiff, the bank's
option to cancel was to become effective immediately. Id. at 294.
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at the defendant's office at the appointed time, however, plaintiff's
representative was informed that the bank had exercised its option to
cancel under the prior written contract, thereby ignoring the oral modi-
fication. In response, the plaintiff instituted suit in federal district court.
On appeal from the trial court's grant of defendant bank's motion
for summary judgment,4 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sug-
gested that the defendant's argument proceeded from the false premise
that section 2-201 of the Code precludes any recovery predicated on an
alleged oral modification of a contract subject to its provisions. The
court stated that although "an oral modification of a written agreement
may theoretically be precluded, the code does explicitly provide for an
oral waiver of the operation of the Statute of Frauds . . . [and] once
the Statute of Frauds is waived, there is no barrier to an oral modifica-
tion of the terms of a written contract under § 2-209(1)." 11 As a result
of its interpretation of the relevant Code sections, the court remanded
the case for resolution of three issues of material fact: whether the
Code's statute of frauds had, in fact, been waived by the parties,
whether there had been an effective modification of the original contract
removing the bank's right to unilateral withdrawal, and whether any
waiver made had been effectively retracted.4 7 Concurring in result
only, Judge Garth expressed fundamental disagreement with the ma-
jority's interpretation of section 2-209, stating that an attempted oral
modification can operate as a waiver of a contract term only, not of
the statute of frauds requirements which pervade Article 2 of the Code.48
45. The trial court, accepting the plaintiff's testimony, found that defendant's at-
tempted oral modification constituted a waiver, under Code section 2-209(4), of its
right to cancel. It also found, however, that, under section 2-209(5), the defendant
had effectively retracted its waiver. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that, in
reliance upon the attempted oral modification, it had made a material change in posi-
don by refraining from proceeding immediately to the defendant's office to reduce the
agreement to writing. A genuine issue of material fact was held to exist, nevertheless,
whether the defendant had given timely notice of its cancellation as required by the
original agreement. Therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment was initially
denied. Double-E Sportswear Corp. v. Girard Trust Bank, 10 UCC REP. SmRv. 1041,
1046-47 (ED. Pa. 1972). After additional proceedings, however, defendant's motion for
summary judgment was renewed and granted. See 488 F.2d at 294.
46. 488 F.2d at 296.
47. Id. at 297.
48. Id. at 298. Judge Garth, whose concurrence in remanding the case was limited
to having determined whether the defendant had made an effective retraction of the
waiver of its right to cancel the contract, paraphrased section 2-209(4) as follows:
"Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the requirement
[Vol. 15:699
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That the court of appeals could not reach a consensus with respect
to the scope of the waiver provision in section 2-209(4) evidences the
ambiguity of that provision. Nevertheless, uniformity is required if the
courts are to resolve the frequent disputes which arise when parties to a
contract attempt to alter the details of their agreement.
Support for the conclusion of the majority in Double-E that the
statute of frauds requirements of section 2-201 may be waived is avail-
able through an analogy to the relationship between the waiver provi-
sions of section 2-209 (4) and the private writing requirement addressed
in section 2-209(2). The courts which have considered this latter re-
lationship generally have agreed that an attempted oral modification can
operate as a waiver of a "no oral modification" clause.49 If it is accepted
that section 2-209(4) affects subsections (2) and (3) in the same man-
ner, these holdings would provide considerable support for the con-
clusion that the statutory requirement of a writing, as well as a similar
requirement imposed by the parties by contract, may be waived. Sev-
eral persuasive arguments, however, militate against accepting the prem-
ise that a "no oral modification" clause and the section 2-201 writing re-
quirement are indistinguishable with respect to the operation of section
2-209(4). These arguments tend, rather, to support the conclusion of
the concurring opinion in Double-E that section 2-209(4) can operate
only to permit relinquishment of a right to insist upon strict perform-
ance of a contractual term.
Initially, reference may be made to the use of the term "waiver" in
section 2-209(5), which provides: "A party who has made a waiver
affecting an executory portion of the contract may retract the waiver
by reasonable notification received by the other party that strict per-
formance will be required of any term waived . . . ." 10 Clearly, the
statute of frauds referred to in section 2-209(3) is not a "term" of the
contract but a statutory standard which must be satisfied before certain
contracts for the sale of goods may be enforced. As noted by the con-
of sub-section (2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver of the particular condition, tervn
or portion of the written contract sought to be waived." Id. at 298 n.1 (emphasis
supplied).
49. See All-Year Golf, Inc. v. Products Investors Corp, 34 App. Div. 2d 246, 310
N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Thomas Knutson Shipbuilding Corp. v. George W.
Rogers Constr. Corp., 6 UCC Ra_. SERV. 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); Universal Builders,
Inc. v. Moon Motor Lodge, Inc., 430 Pa. 550, 244 A.2d 10 (1968); Inwood Knitting
Mills, Inc. v. Budge Mfg. Co., 1 UCC REP. SERv. 84 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1962); cf. C.I.T. Corp.
v. Jonnet, 3 UCC RaP. SERV. 321 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1965).
50. UCC § 2-209(5) (emphasis supplied).
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curring judge in Double-E, an interpretation that section 2-209(4)
permits waiver of the statutory writing requirement would "ascribe
one meaning to the term 'waiver' as it is used in § 2-209(4) and another
meaning to that term as it is used in § 2-209(5)." 51 In addition, under
such an interpretation, section 2-209(5) would permit retraction of
waivers affecting a contract term but not those pertaining to the statute
of frauds.52 This untoward result is unsupported by either case law or
explicit language in the Code. It is submitted that a more reasonable
interpretation would treat the reference in subsection (5) to a "term
waived" as indicative of precisely that which the draftsmen intended may
be waived as a result of an unsuccessful attempt to modify a contract.
The historical development of a writing requirement also weighs
against an interpretation of section 2-209 (4) permitting waiver of the
Code's statute of frauds. Section 2-201 was developed 300 years after
the initial attempt to preclude enforcement of nonexistent contracts.
Although the procedural rules of early English courts may have created
a greater need to protect against fraud in 1677 than exists today, it is
clear that the draftsmen of section 2-201 were cognizant of a similar
modern need,53 derived partially from the evolution of more sophisti-
cated commercial transactions 4 and partially from the erosion by judi-
cially created exceptions of the original Statute's uniformity and effec-
tiveness.55 Thus, the draftsmen apparently had a dual purpose when
creating section 2-201: to prevent perjury and fraud and to create a
new uniformity and efficacy commensurate with the requirements of
modem commercial reality. Towards the objective of uniformity in the
application of the statute of frauds, it would seem desirable to provide
in a single provision the general writing requirement and all sanctioned
exceptions. That section 2-201 reflects such an attempt has already
51. 488 F.2d at 299.
52. The majority in Double-E, in a somewhat strained argument, discounted this
inconsistency as a mere "drafting oversight." Conceding that there is no explicit provi-
sion in subsection (5) for retraction of a waiver of the statute of frauds, the court
suggested that such a provision should be read into that section, stating: "Any other
interpretation compels the conclusion that a party 'who has made a waiver' of the
Statute of Frauds could never retract that waiver." 488 F.2d at 297 n.7. It is submitted
that the very unreasonableness of that result supports the conclusion that the statute
of frauds may not be "waived" under subsection (4).
53. UCC § 2-201, Comment 1.
54. Id. § 1-102(2) (a). See also Arcuri v. Weiss, 198 Pa. Super. 506, 184 A.2d 24
(1962).
55. See notes 14-15 & 17 supra & accompanying text.
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been suggested, supported by an evaluation that the four exceptions
codified in that section reveal a carefully drafted blend of liberalization
and qualification of prior law. 6 It is submitted that this effort on the
part of the framers of the Code indicates that sections 2-201 (2) and (3)
were intended to constitute a codification of all permissible exceptions
to the general rule in subsection (1), rather than a mere enumeration
of several exemplary exceptions.
This conclusion is supported by explicit language in the Code. Sec-
tion 1-102 (3) provides that the "effect of provisions of this Act may be
varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Act .... ,, 17
The terms of section 2-201(1) clearly provide otherwise, that section
stating: "Except as othenvise provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable ... unless
there is some writing . . . ." - Moreover, comment 2 to section 1-102
further indicates the intended operational effect of the statute of frauds,
recognizing that although section 2-201 "does not explicitly preclude
oral waiver of the requirement of a writing, . . . a fair reading denies
enforcement to such a waiver as part of the 'contract' made unen-
forceable ....
Perhaps the strongest argument that the requirements of section 2-201
are not subject to waiver evolves from the belief that the draftsmen
could not have intended one provision of the Code to render another
nugatory. Section 2-209(3) expressly applies the section 2-201 writing
requirement to contract modifications. Under the interpretation af-
forded section 2-209 in Double-E, however, an oral modification which
is deficient under subsection (3) could operate as a waiver of the statute
of frauds under subsection (4). As a result, enforcement would be
permitted under subsection (4) of the very activity which the preceding
subsection rendered unenforceable, and subsection (3) would be mean-
ingless. Although the Double-E court attempted to avoid this result by
"filling in the interstices" of subsection (5) to permit retraction of a
waiver of the statute of frauds at any time prior to reliance,60 it is
56. See notes 21-32 supra & accompanying text.
57. UCC § 1-102(3).
58. Id. 5 2-201 (1) (emphasis supplied).
59. Id. § 1-102, Comment 2.
60. 488 F.2d at 297 n.7. This interpretation of subsection (5) was also advocated in
Comment, The Mechanics of Parol Modification of Contracts Under the Uniform Corn-
mc-rcial Code, 29 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 665 (1968). It is submitted that the failure to pro-
vide in subsection (5) for the retraction of waivers of the statute of frauds should be
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difficult to discern how retraction, with its concomitant reimposition of
a writing requirement, could affect the enforceability of an oral modi-
fication entered into while the operation of the statute of frauds pur-
portedly was suspended. 61
CONCLUSION
Two seemingly inescapable problems are created if section 2-209(4)
is interpreted to permit waiver of the statute of frauds requirements of
section 2-201. First, such a construction reads into the Code an excep-
tion to the writing requirement of section 2-201 notwithstanding the
apparently exhaustive enumeration of exceptions provided therein. Sec-
ond, to permit waiver of the statute of frauds destroys the internal con-
sistency of section 2-209 by removing any purpose for the writing re-
quirement in subsection (3). It is submitted that restricting the operation
of section 2-209(4) to permit the relinquishment only of a right to
insist upon strict performance of a contractual term better reflects the
intended operational effect of the section in providing a flexible means
of effectuating contract modification while protecting the parties against
perjury and fraud.
viewed not as an oversight on the part of the draftsmen but as an indication that sub-
section (4) was not intended to authorize such waivers. See note 52 supra.
61. If the statute of frauds were waived, there would be nothing to prevent the oral
modification from becoming enforceable immediately; either party could sue for a
breach of the agreement regardless of reliance. Since, by definition, the modification
itself would be irretractable, there appears to be no available means of giving retro-
active effect to a subsequent retraction of the waiver, although that is exactly what
must occur if, under the interpretation in Double-E, subsection (3) is to have any
meaning.
